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Abstract
Bitcoin was the first successful attempt at creating a decentralized cryptographic pay-
ment system. Overcoming the trusted third party hurdle, which plagued earlier solu-
tions for decades, it paved the way for a whole family of blockchain protocols. However,
its fully replicated design prevents Bitcoin from scaling. The scalability crisis is not
unique to Bitcoin as this issue extends to most of its descendant blockchain protocols.
A new paradigm that enables to systematically scale blockchain protocols seems due.
This thesis introduces a formal general framework for scaling blockchain protocols by
sharding. The framework is modular and it can be adjusted for different needs or sets
of assumptions. We prove that sharded protocols obtained by following our scheme
(with correct modules in place) live up to the same safety and liveness guarantees as
their non-sharded counterparts. The proof is general and relies on well-defined speci-
fications of certain components. This lays the ground for simple proofs of correctness
for sharded protocols obtained by following the proposed scheme.
The framework is not left as an obscure specification of some high level structure;
explicit use is demonstrated by applying it to shard Algorand. As part of this concrete
construction, a tamper-proof mechanism to assign nodes to shards is introduced. This
mechanism is constructed by using verifiable random functions and can safely withstand
a powerful adaptive adversary.
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Abbreviations and Notations
n : the number of users in the system
m : the number of shards in the system
r : an arbitrary round index
TX : transaction space
UTXO : unspent transactions output
PKS : public-key space
PK r : the set of all public keys in the system at time r
Cr : the state of an unsharded system when round r begins
Br : a block of transactions, approved by an unsharded system in round r
Cri : the state of the ith shard when round r begins
C(r) : the state of a sharded system when round r begins
Bri : a sub-block of transactions, approved by the ith shard in round r
B(r) : a global block of transactions, approved by a sharded system in round r
P : an arbitrary blockchain protocol
[i] : {1, 2, . . . , i}
⊥ : the empty block
◦ : concatenation (e.g. a ◦ b ◦ c = abc)
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
Attempts to create cryptographic payment systems date back to the 1980s and 1990s.
Those early endeavors relied on trusted third parties, deeming such solutions secure
but centralized. In 2008 a whitepaper titled “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
System” [16] introduced the original Bitcoin protocol and coined the term blockchain.
The paper was subsequently followed by the Bitcoin network’s launch in early 2009.
Bitcoin was the first truly decentralized electronic payment system, bypassing financial
institutions, mediators and other trusted third parties. Nodes in the Bitcoin network
store a full copy of a shared transactions ledger. Every new block of approved trans-
actions is verified by all participating nodes, as they append it. Nodes compete over
finding the next block, along with a solution to a cryptographic riddle. Overall, the
collective computational power across the network takes the trusted third party’s role.
This design marked a breakthrough, overcoming the trusted third party hurdle. It
inspired the creation of an entire new category of blockchain protocols, modeled after
Bitcoin. At the same time, this design prevents Bitcoin from scaling, marking its days
as a global payment network numbered. The scalability crisis is not unique to Bitcoin,
as this issue extends to most blockchain protocols that followed.
A new formal scheme that enables to systematically scale a whole category of
blockchain protocols is the subject of this thesis.
Blockchain Protocols and Their Usage
Blockchain is a data model that keeps track of ordered sequences of transactions in
a decentralized and persistent manner. It is known first and foremost as a platform
for implementation of cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin [16], Ripple [17], Litecoin and
others. Several other applications adopted this technology as well, most notably smart
contracts [6] and supply chains [1, 12].
Different blockchain protocols propose different recipes on how to create an agreed
upon shared transaction ledger, often under different sets of assumptions.
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Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake In order to withstand adversarial behavior,
blockchain protocols employ various defense mechanisms, suited for a decentralized
setting. Most notable are proof-of-work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS) approaches.
In PoW protocols, a user’s influence on the system is proportional to its computing
power. Such protocols provide safety as long as the majority of computing power in
the network is held by honest participants. In PoS protocols, it is proportional to a
user’s stake (e.g. money) in the system and safety depends on the majority of overall
wealth being held by honest parties.
Permissioned and Permissionless Loosely speaking, blockchain protocols can be
categorized as permissioned vs. permissionless. In permissioned protocols, such as
Ripple [17] and Hyperledger Fabric [2], only known nodes, who have permission, can
take part in the system. In permissionless protocols, such as Bitcoin [16], Ethereum [6]
and Algorand [7], any node may participate at will.
Forks Some blockchain protocols, such as Bitcoin [16] and Ethereum [6], may fork,
i.e., there may temporarily exist multiple conflicting versions of the chain until the
conflict is finally resolved. Other protocols, such as Algorand [7], do not fork, or may
fork only with negligible probability.
1.2 The Scalability Debacle
In most existing blockchain protocols the system behaves as one fully replicated state
machine, regardless of the network size. The state progresses by appending one block
at a time to the end of the chain. This raises two main scalability concerns:
1. Bounded throughput, waste of available computing power:
Once additional participants join the network, overall computing power increases
and (presumably) more transactions pend approval. Assuming that the network
has already been approving transactions at its maximum capacity, the added
computing power could theoretically be used to serve those added transactions’
approval. However, the intervals between block approvals must remain unchanged
and still only a single block at a time, whose capacity is bounded by the protocol,
could be appended to the chain. Overall, the network’s throughput remains
bounded by some fixed maximum capacity.
This problem is most prominent with Bitcoin and similar PoW protocols. As the
collective computing power increases, nodes have to work proportionally harder
in order to simply maintain the same old throughput, let alone increase it.
2. Waste of space:
The entire global state must be locally stored by all nodes that wish to participate
in the protocol. In relatively small networks this indeed appears to be essential.
6
However, surpassing some desired redundancy threshold, this simply wastes space.
Moreover, requiring nodes to store the global state, which could be sizable, in its
entirety leaves lighter nodes with limited storage out of the game, thus impeding
decentralization.
In a theoretical global network with millions of participating nodes, it seems
absurd to store millions of identical copies of an entire enormous global state.
Still, most current protocols are designed that way. This distances them from
becoming those idealized decentralized networks used by the masses.
1.2.1 Sharding
Both scalability issues could be ameliorated through sharding.
Sharding is a design pattern for obtaining scalability of computing systems, by dividing
the computational tasks and the data space into multiple entities, that act mostly
independently. Sharding blockchain protocols intuitively means dividing nodes in a
large network into smaller groups, where each group is in charge of approving a distinct
subset of pending transactions and of storing a subset of the global state.
1.3 Contributions
This work presents a formal generic framework for sharding blockchain protocols.
The proposed framework is formal as it carefully defines all that must be defined and
correctness is asserted thoroughly. The framework is generic as it follows a modular
design which enables key components, including the blockchain protocol itself, to be
easily swapped and independently created. The framework is general purposed and
suits both the UTXO model and the account balance model. Moreover, it suits both
permissioned and permissionless protocols and it mostly targets PoS protocols.
The framework executes in two-phased rounds, within a strongly synchronous net-
work. During the first phase, disjoint sub-blocks of approved transactions are simulta-
neously committed by all shards. During the second phase, relevant cross-shard data is
synchronized. Throughout this two-phased execution a specified workflow is followed,
while maintaining three invariants. Each invariant is associated with a corresponding
interface that defines a specific module. Applying the framework can be done simply
by following our scheme while providing concrete implementations to all these inter-
faces. We provide a formal proof that as long as our scheme is correctly followed, i.e.
all interface implementations maintain the desired invariants, then the new sharded
protocol is indeed correct - satisfying safety and liveness. A useful result of this proof,
whose only assumption is that supplied modules match their interface specifications,
is that any subsequent protocols following our scheme, need only prove their modules’
correctness to establish the overall correctness.
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We demonstrate the applicability of our framework by sharding Algorand [7, 14]. A
concrete implementation of all required interfaces is provided and the implementation’s
correctness is fully proved. Then, correctness of the sharded Algorand immediately
follows. The methods used to implement the sharding interface are quite general. As
we already established their correctness, these specific modules could be reused to shard
protocols other that Algorand too, without having to re-establish their correctness.
Resiliency A major standing issue with sharded protocols is resiliency in presence of
adversarial behavior. A potential attack vector by an adaptive adversary is to move all
Byzantine nodes into a single shard, thereby controlling that shard despite controlling
only a small minority of nodes overall.
The implementation presented in chapter 4 solves this issue by assigning partici-
pants time-bounded leases to uniformly selected shards. The assignment mechanism is
decentralized and the generated assignments are both uniformly random and tamper-
proof by using verifiable random functions (VRFs) to implement it. These nodes-into-
shards assignments are iteratively shuffled, at a shuffling rate corresponding to the
adversary’s adaptability, as determined by the environment assumptions model. The
provided proof establishes that as long as the adversary controls no more than 1/4 of all
nodes, then it never controls more than 1/3 of the nodes in each shard with extremely
high probability, even for extraordinarily long executions (e.g. the probability of ever
encountering failure < 10−15, totalled over a million years of continuous execution).
Thus, the suggested implementation maintains safety despite Byzantine mobility.
1.4 Thesis Outline and Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
In chapter 2 a formal model expressing the behavior of blockchain protocols is laid out.
In chapter 3 a sharding scheme is introduced and its correctness is established, based on
the definitions detailed in chapter 2. In chapter 4 a concrete construction implementing
the sharding scheme is given and two sharded Algorand variants are created. In chap-
ter 5 we survey recent work regarding sharding blockchain protocols. We also discuss
the different approaches taken towards handling cross-shard transactions and compare
them to the approach taken in this work. In chapter 6 we discuss the applicability of
our framework and relaxation of some its assumptions.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries, Model and
Definitions
We consider a distributed system in which nodes communicate through a strongly
synchronous gossip network. Nodes are computational entities that execute some pro-
tocol. Nodes may join and leave the network, or the set of nodes could remain constant
throughout the execution. Each user owns a pair of public and secret keys. When
a user joins the system for the first time, their public key is recorded and this log is
publicly available. Each node is owned and operated by a specific user. We use the
terms “node” and “participant” interchangeably when referring to the machine used to
participate in the protocol. By “user”, we shall refer to the client operating the node
and using the system (to send payments, for example).
The end goal of the system is to run some protocol, denoted P . In our case P
would be a blockchain protocol, that can be either permissioned or permissionless. P is
assumed to be a PoS protocol where users hold voting power in proportion to their stake
in the system. Alternatively, if all nodes are guaranteed to possess equal computing
powers, then P can also be a PoW protocol. In order to simplify matters, from this
point forward we regard all participants as equally powerful and assume that wealthier
players have more distinct nodes under their control.
Notations: n denotes the number of nodes, ⊥ denotes the empty block,
◦ means concatenation (e.g. a ◦ b ◦ c = abc) and [i] = {1, 2, . . . , i}.
2.1 Assumptions About the Environment
2.1.1 Users, Keys, Public-Key Space
Every user owns a pair of public and secret keys. Let u denote some arbitrary user
in the system, then PKu denotes u’s public key and SKu denotes u’s secret key. PKu
is known to all participants and identifies u uniquely. SKu is known only to u and is
used for authentication.
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PKS denotes the public-key space. It is the set of all strings that could be used as
acceptable public keys. For any u in the system, it holds that PKu ∈ PKS .
PKr refers to the set of all public keys in the system at time r.
2.1.2 Additional Cryptographic Assumptions
We assume the existence of a unique digital signature scheme SIG, as defined in [8, 11,
14]. SIG is used to generate (PKu, SKu) pairs in the system. It provides SignSKu and
VerPKu functionality. Specifically:
• SIG is a digital signature scheme:
– SignSKu(x) ≜ Sign(SKu, x) returns a value σ.
– VerPKu(x, σ) ≜ Ver(PKu, x, σ) returns True if σ = SignSKu(x).
It is hard to find σ for x that returns True without knowing SKu.
It is hard to find x′ ̸= x such that Ver(PKu , x, σ) = Ver(PKu , x′, σ) = True.
• SIG is unique:
– It is hard to find PKu, x, σ and σ′ ̸= σ such that:
Ver(PKu, x, σ) = Ver(PKu, x, σ′) = True.
This holds when SKu is known, even for maliciously selected (PKu, SKu),
σ = σPKu(x) is the unique signature for x and PKu.
We assume the existence of an efficiently computable ideal hash function, H.
• H is available to all participants and they can run it locally.
• H is modeled as a random oracle. It takes an arbitrarily long input and returns
a hashlen bits long binary string. When x is chosen uniformly at random:
– H(x) is regarded as a uniformly distributed integer between 0 and 2hashlen−1.
– .H(x) is regarded as a uniformly distributed binary between 0 and 1.
It should be pointed out that we adhere to the same cryptographic assumptions Micali
et al. make in Algorand [7, 14], as we extend some of their constructions.
2.1.3 Adversarial Model
The adversary is a polynomially bounded entity, able to attack any target user’s node
and attain total control over their actions. It cannot successfully forge digital signatures
by uncorrupted users and cannot simultaneously control or attack more than a fraction
0 ≤ b < 1 of active users; in chapter 4 we set b = 1/4.
A participant under adversarial control is considered Byzantine. A Byzantine par-
ticipant may follow the protocol or it may deviate arbitrarily. All non-Byzantine par-
ticipant are honest and meticulously follow the protocol. Gaining control over a set
10
of target participants takes ttakeover rounds to complete. During these rounds targeted
nodes are still honest. Once an attack has been set in motion, it cannot be altered or
aborted; the adversary must see it to completion.
We sometimes refer to an adversary as being either static or adaptive. A static
adversary can introduce malicious participants to the network, but it can never gain
control over honest ones. Equivalently, for a static adversary ttakeover → ∞. An
adaptive adversary is mobile, it can actively attack honest participants and gain control
within a finite ttakeover ∈ N+ number of rounds. If an adaptive adversary is at capacity
(simultaneously controls or attacks b of all participants) it must retire control over a
participant in order to initiate an attack on another.
2.2 Blockchain Protocols
We discuss blockchain protocols that execute in a sequence of consecutive rounds.
Round r ∈ {1, 2, ...} results in a block of approved transactions, denoted Br, appended
to the chain. The initial state of the system is determined by a genesis block, B0.
Any P we consider requires an honest majority of 0.5 < hP ≤ 1 of all participants,
i.e. 0 ≤ b < 1 − hP . Then, it provides safety and liveness guarantees: all admitted
blocks must be admissible (soon to be defined) and some of them non empty. We
limit the discussion to protocols that do not fork 1. When round r completes, Br is
finalized and its content is indisputable.
Let us introduce some definitions in order to dive into a more rigorous discussion:
Definition 2.1 Transaction Space:
Let P be some blockchain protocol. TXP denote the transaction space of P , or simply
TX since P is known. A transaction is an atomic operation, defined per P ’s logic.
Any transaction tx that could be created at some point in some execution of P sat-
isfies tx ∈ TX . Transactions contains various data fields, dictated by P . At the bare
minimum, a tx in all protocols we consider is assumed to include the following fields:
• tx.from : stores the identity of the user who created tx.
This field must include exactly one public key, denoted PKfrom ∈ PKS .
– In a payment system PKfrom would be the public key of a user sending a
payment, or transferring some resource it owns.
• tx.to : stores identity of the user who receives the output of tx.
This field must include at least one PKto ∈ PKS , more if tx has multiple outputs.
– In a payment system PKto would be the public key of a user receiving a
payment, or some other resource.
• tx.sig : stores SignSKfrom signature on this unique tx, used for authentication.
1This restriction could later be lifted, see discussion section. It simplifies matters for the time being.
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– if PKfrom is a multisig address, this requires m-of-n signatures.
Any tx ′ with either of these fields is missing or invalid satisfies tx ′ /∈ TX . Note that a
syntactically incorrect transaction is easily detectable and tx ′ is immediately discarded.
Definition 2.2 Block:
A block of transactions is any set X such that X ⊆ TX . Usually (and unless stated
otherwise), blocks are viewed as lists or ordered sets of transactions and then X ∈ TXN.
Sometimes, blocks can be viewed as unordered sets, in which case X ∈ 2TX .
Definition 2.3 State, Context:
Cr denotes the context of the protocol when round r begins. The admissibility of any
block to be added to the chain in round r is determined by P with respect to Cr.
The state of the system is defined by an ordered list of approved blocks. It is normally
assumed that the context and the state equal, therefore we usually use Cr to denote
both. The state at time r is recursively defined by Cr = Cr−1 ◦Br−1 with C0 = ⊥.
In settings where blocks are ordered sets, the state is totally ordered, Cr ∈ (TXN)N+ .
In settings where blocks are unordered sets, the state is weakly ordered, Cr ∈ (2TX )N+ .
Explicitly: take some txi ∈ Bi, txj ∈ Bj . If i < j then txi’s approval predates txj ’s. If
i = j and blocks are ordered sets, then txi, txj approval order is induced by the internal
order in that block. If i = j and blocks are unordered sets, then txi, txj are considered
to be simultaneously approved.
We refer to B0 as the genesis block and to C1 = ⊥ ◦ B0 as the genesis state, both
are assumed to be valid. Applying an admissible block on a valid state transitions the
system into a new valid state. This leads us to the next definition.
Definition 2.4 Admissible Blocks, Valid States, Legal Executions:
A block is admissible at time r if all transactions in that block, in order of appearance,
could be appended to the chain and admitted to the system, in compliance with the
protocol’s logic. P is assumed to include a well defined deterministic function named
Verify . It takes an ordered set of transactions along with a context Cr and returns
True if the set is admissible with regards to Cr or False otherwise. Formally:
Verify : (TXN, (TXN)N+)→ {True,False}
C0 = ⊥ is a valid state, the rest is inductively defined such that:
Verify(Br, Cr) = True ⇐⇒ Cr+1 = Cr ◦Br is valid , Br is admissible at time r
An execution is legal if and only if all of its states are valid.
P must never permit invalid intermediate states. Any prefix of an admissible block
must also be admissible on its own, with respect to the same state. Take Br such that
Verify(Br, Cr) = True and any prefix of Br, denoted X. Then, Verify(X,Cr) = True
always holds. Additionally, Verify(Br \X,Cr ◦X) = True should also hold.
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Remark. In practice, blocks contain additional bookkeeping records (such as headers,
PoW etc.) on top of the list of approved transactions. However, our interest lies in
the state of the ledger, as determined by those ordered sets of transactions. Therefore,
in order to keep this focus, we abstract. Any additional bookkeeping that might be
required throughout this work will be handled separately and explicitly. Alternatively,
consider Verify as one component of a more comprehensive Validate method.
Definition 2.5 Intra-Block Transactions:
tx ∈ Br is considered an intra-block transaction if its input depends on the output of an-
other transaction tx′ ∈ Br preceding it within the same block: Br = [. . . , tx′, . . . , tx, . . .]
such that Verify(Br, Cr) = True and Verify(Br \ {tx′}, Cr) = False.
Block Permutation Effect: The existence of intrablock transactions gives rise to
cases where two blocks, Br and Brπ, consist of equal sets of transactions in different
orderings, such that Verify(Br, Cr) = True while Verify(Brπ, Cr) = False. Take, for
example, Br = [. . . , tx′, . . . , tx, . . .] from definition 2.5 such that Verify(Br, Cr) = True
and Verify(Br \{tx′}, Cr) = False. Define Brπ = [. . . , . . . , tx, . . . , tx′] = [Br \{tx′}]◦tx′.
Verify(Brπ, Cr) = False follows from definition 2.4, as states are totally ordered.
Such cases may cause ambiguity and raise additional difficulties when parallelizing
Verify or transforming a system that outputs one fully replicated block at a time into
one producing several sub-blocks, separately and simultaneously. For these reasons,
from this point forward, we consider only protocols (or variants of protocols) that do
not permit intrablock transactions. Specifically, we require Verify to always return
Verify(Br, Cr) = Verify(Brπ, Cr) for all Br, Cr and any possible permutation π.
Lemma 2.2.1. If P does not permit intra-block transactions, then any subset X ⊆ Br
of an admissible Br also makes an admissible block, applicable instead of Br at time r.
Formally: Verify(Br, Cr) = True ⇒ ∀X ⊆ Br : Verify(X,Cr) = True.
Proof. For any permutation π it holds that Verify(Br, Cr) = Verify(Brπ, Cr) = True.
Consider a permutation π where X appears as the first |X| transaction within Brπ, in
some internal order. Any prefix of Brπ, in particular one of length |X|, must also be
admissible.
We do not permit intra-block transactions, i.e. we do not allow a resource
received within the round to be immediately spent.2 All resources being put to use in
round r must already be admitted when the round began, appearing in Cr. Then, the
internal order of Br plays no role. Funds or resources received during round r become
available to spend starting round r+1, as they appear in Cr+1. This strategy appears
reasonable when rounds are frequent enough, it resolves such ambiguity altogether.
2Removing this assumption, sharded protocols created by the framework still maintain safety. See
discussion section for more details.
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From this point forward, as internal order is insignificant, we shall treat each block
as an unordered set. All transactions appearing within the same block are considered
simultaneously approved and Verify takes the form:
Verify : (2TX , (2TX )N+)→ {True,False}.
Definition 2.6 Conflicting Sets, Competing Transactions:
Let tx1, tx2 ∈ TX be two distinct transactions. If there exists someX ⊆ TX and a state
C ⊆ (2TX )N+ such that Verify(X ∪ {tx1}, C) = True and Verify(X ∪ {tx2}, C) = True
but Verify(X ∪ {tx1, tx2}, C) = False then tx1, tx2 are competing transactions and
X ∪ {tx1, tx2} is a conflicting set (note that this definition generalizes the notion of
double spending 3).
Let X = {tx1, tx2, ..., txk} be a conflicting set s.t. ∀txi ∈ X : X \ {txi} is an
admissible set, then X is minimal. Observe that all distinct pairs txi, txj ∈ X are
competing transactions. 4
Definition 2.7 Support Sets:
The support set of X ⊆ TX at time r is the minimal subset of Cr that is required to
correctly determine whether any X ′ ⊆ X could be accepted or must be rejected, per
P ’s logic. Denoted Suppr(X) ≜ Supp(X,Cr) ⊆ Cr, this is a weakly ordered set. The
order between elements is induced by their order in Cr.
Supp(X,Cr) satisfies ∀X ′ ⊆ X : Verify(X ′, Cr) = Verify(X ′,Supp(X,Cr))
Observe that:
1. ∀X ′ ⊆ X : Suppr(X ′) ⊆ Suppr(X)
2. ∀Cr ⊇ Y ⊇ Suppr(X) : Verify(X ,Suppr(X)) = Verify(X ,Y )
are both implied.
Note that Supp definitions are modeled after and rely on internal P behavior.
Since minimality is a requirement and definitions are P -specific, Supp is somewhat
illusive. Therefore, we also define Supp(X) ≜ Supp(X,TX) ⊆ TX which splits TX
into transactions that may appear in X’s support and those that never will. Then,
Supp(X,Cr) ⊆ Supp(X) ∩ Cr ⊆ Cr always holds and is easier to use.
3Under the UTXO model, if tx1, tx2 compete over the same utxo, they certainly conflict. Take, for
example, X = ∅ then X ∪ {tx1, tx2} is a conflicting set (it is also minimal). Generally, a resource may
be used or accessed more than once. Consider a venue that can hold up to 200 distinct visitors at a
time. Visitors compete over the same resource (entrance to the venue), yet as long as fewer than 201
of them coexist, no conflict arises.
4Let X be a set of 201 distinct visitors asking to enter an empty venue that is capped at 200. Then X
is a conflicting set, any proper subset of X (in particular one of size 200) is admissible and therefore X
is minimal. The same analysis applies to the sum of monetary transactions under the account balance
model. Building on top of these definitions makes our scheme general enough to be useful under both
the UTXO and account balance models.
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2.3 Sharded Blockchain Protocols
When dealing with sharded protocols, we slightly adjust some terminology. Let S
denote a sharded blockchain protocol and m denote the number of shards. Then S’s
participants are scattered between those m shards. Nodes that participate in the ith
shard run some intra-shard sub-protocol, denoted Si, that sequentially outputs blocks of
the form B1i , B2i , . . . , Bri , . . .. We generally assume that S is synchronized. Specifically,
if Si hasn’t decided on Bri within the rth time frame, then Bri = ⊥ .
Definition 2.8 Global Blocks and Local Blocks:
B(r) denotes the rth global block. B(r) is a distributed block rather than a fully replicated
one. We define B(r) = Br1 ◦ . . . ◦ Brm or simply B(r) =
⋃m
i=1B
r
i , since we consider B(r)
to be simultaneously approved. We refer to Br1, . . . , Brm as sub-blocks or local blocks.
Normally, Bri is locally stored within Si’s nodes. The sharded protocol S is assumed
to allow its participants to query any Sj regarding the content of any Brj .
Definition 2.9 Global State and Local Contexts:
Given an environment in which the system is not fully replicated, some participants
view of it may differ from others. This requires us to make a clear distinction between
contexts and the state of the system.
C(r) denotes the global state when round r begins. The global state of a sharded
system follows the same definition a state in an unsharded system follows. Specifically,
it is recursively defined by C(r) = C(r−1) ◦ B(r−1) with C(0) = ⊥. The global state is
the full ledger, defined by an ordered list of approved global blocks.
Cri denotes the local context (sometimes called local state) of the ith shard at
time r. This is some subset of the global state C(r), stored in Si nodes. Its partici-
pants execute Si and produce Bri under that local context Cri . We specifically require
Verify(Bri , Cri ) = True to hold, the rest of Cri definition is dependant on the protocol
S at hand.
We use this different notation so to clearly distinct between sharded and unsharded
systems. Any definition relating to the state (e.g. support sets) remains unchanged in
the sharded setting, other than using C(r) instead of Cr.
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Chapter 3
Shardder: The Sharding
Framework
3.1 Overview
This chapter presents Shardder, a framework for transforming an overcrowded network
running a single instance of P into a network that runs several specialized sub-instances,
working together in cooperation. These sub-protocols, denoted P1, · · · , Pm, are simul-
taneously executed and produce m disjoint sub-blocks in parallel. The overall capacity
of the network increases by up to m-fold, while preserving P ’s original logic (as defined
by its Verify predicate). Following a careful division of labor, Pi executes correctly from
both local and global perspectives. This is achieved despite the fact that participants
store only a fraction of the global state locally.
Shardder is generic in a sense that while the framework follows a preset workflow,
several key components are black-boxed into well defined interfaces. Each interface
lays out a set of requirements that any adequate implementation must fulfill. The
framework-user, i.e. the deployer, must provide implementations of three interfaces, a
concrete protocol P and a granularity parameter m ∈ N+. Plugging these components
into the framework results in defining SP , a Sharded P protocol. Swapping some
interface implementation results in creating a different sharded variant of P . Different
variants might be better suited for different settings, as demonstrated in chapter 4.
Any sharded variant created by applying the framework lives up to original protocol’s
safety and liveness guarantees, provided that all interface implementations (provably)
meet all specified requirements, this we prove in section 3.4.
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3.1.1 Assumptions
P is assumed to be some blockchain protocol that:
1. Does not permit intra-block transactions.
2. Does not fork. Block approval is final and cannot be overturned.
3. Provides safety and liveness, as long as at least 0.5 < hP ≤ 1 of its participants
are honest.
See discussion in section 6.1 regarding relaxing assumptions 1 and 2.
3.1.2 Key Parameters
n - denotes the initial number of participants.
m - denotes the number of shards set by the deployer. m ∈ N+ s.t. n≫ m.
h - denotes the honesty rate the resulting SP assumes. It must hold that hP ≤ h ≤ 1.
The precise value of h is set by the deployer, in accordance with their concrete
interface implementations, acceptable values for m and adversarial assumptions.
We assume that the number of participants remains θ(n) throughout the execution and
doesn’t fluctuate too wildly. Permissionless environments in which specific users may
join or leave are suitable, as long as the number of active users remains stable. 1
3.1.3 Key Components
Partition TX is partitioned into TX1 , . . . ,TXm according to the Partition interface.
By definition, the sole authority regarding approval of pending transactions from
within TXi is Pi.
Membership Participants are divided into m groups by the Membership interface.
It must ensure that at least hP out of every Pi’s participants are honest, thus
enabling them to execute the underlying P .
Sync Global changes are tracked and local states are updated, using the Sync interface.
1Adjusting the framework for networks with significant fluctuations requires to dynamically adjust
m for n/m as n deviates. This extension is left for future work, see discussion section.
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3.2 Algorithms and Workflow
3.2.1 Bootstrapping the System
To construct the system, concrete implementations of all abstractions used by the
framework are required. This includes the code to a blockchain protocol P and to
non-abstract classes implementing the sharding interfaces. Additionally, genesis data
is needed to set the genesis state. The framework takes a standard valid P -formatted
genesis block, B0, for this purpose.
During bootstrap, m specialized instances of P , referred to by P1, . . . , Pm , are cre-
ated. The instances are then initialized so to reflect the appropriate genesis state:
B0 data is broken into m shards, according to Partition. Thus, transforming B0 into
an equivalent distributed block B(0) s.t. tx ∈ B0 ⇔ tx ∈ B(0).
Algorithm 1: Bootstrap Shardder
Input : P,B0, nodes , m ∈ N+ , Partition , Membership , Sync
Output : Bootstrapped System
1 define Partm = Partition.Part(TX,m) = {TX1, ..., TXm};
2 init Membership and Sync;
3 forall i ∈ [m] do
4 C0i = ⊥;
5 B0i = B0 ∩ TXi;
6 RS0i = Sync.collectSupporti(B0) ;
7 construct Pi and set C1i = C0i ◦B0i ◦RS0i ;
8 end
9 scatter nodes between P1, . . . , Pm according to Membership;
10 return P1, . . . , Pm , Partm, B(0) =
⋃m
i=1B
0
i ;
3.2.2 Making Progress
After bootstrap, the framework follows Algorithm 2 and executes in sequential two
phased rounds. Every round yields a new global block of approved transactions, which
transitions the system into its next state.
During the first phase, the P phase, P1, . . . , Pm simultaneously execute a single
block creation round. Every Pi is essentially an instance of P with protection against
unauthorized participants, as described in Algorithm 3. Each Pi executes under its
local context Cri and takes as input pending transactions from TXi, its designated
partition. Consequently, Pi outputs a locally admissible block Bri ⊆ TXi such that
Verify(Bri , Cri ) = True. 2
2An empty sub-block is decided by default if Pi times out. Empty blocks are always admissible.
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Reaching the second phase, the sync phase, B(r) is globally known and the next
global state C(r+1) = C(r) ◦B(r) is determined. Then, during the sync phase and before
transitioning to the next round, shards utilize the Sync interface in order to update
their local states to include the up-to-date Supp(TXi , C(r) ◦B(r)). 3
Algorithm 2: Shardder Workflow
Input : a stream of pending transactions
Output : B(1), B(2), ...
1 Bootstrap; r = 1;
2 while safety holds do
// protocol phase
3 execute P1, . . . , Pm on TX1 , . . . ,TXm respectively;
4 set B(r) = ⋃mi=1Bri and make public;
// sync phase
5 forall i ∈ [m] do
6 RSri = Sync.collectSupporti(B(r));
7 Cr+1i = Cri ◦Bri ◦RSri ;
8 end
9 adjust nodes’ memberships;
10 r = r + 1;
11 end
Algorithm 3: Pi block creation round, as executed by PKu
Input : a set of pending transactions T ⊆ TXi
Output : an approved block Bri ⊆ T
1 let σu be a proof binding PKu and i, generated by Membership.getMembership;
2 while running round r of P with context Cri do
3 attach (PKu, σu, i, r) to all messages directed to the underlying P ;
4 foreach received protocol message from node w do
5 if Membership.verifyMember(PKw, σw, i, r) = False then
6 discard message;
7 else pass message to underlying P ;
8 end
9 end
10 return Bri ;
3Take notice of the fact that Pi’s synchronization with B(r) does not imply that every node must
run or acquire every transaction. While this is a technical design issue, sub-blocks could batch together
transactions that belong in distinct shards’ support. Then, nodes need to download nothing more than
the relevant sections of each sub-block.
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3.3 Interfaces, Methods and Invariants
The sharded protocol’s correctness relies on three invariants being kept throughout its
execution. In order to plug each invariant into the framework, an interface abstraction
is used. The interfaces specify a set of methods that must be implemented, as those
methods are invoked by the framework. As long as concrete implementations supplied
by the deployer satisfy the following requirements, SP ’s correctness immediately follows
from the proof in Section 3.4.
3.3.1 Conflict Preserving Partitioning
Interface Name: Partition
Role: Splits the workload into well defined pools, each allotted to a specific shard.
Key Methods:
1. Part : (2TX , N+)→ (2TX )N+
Partm(TX) = Part(TX ,m) = {TX1 , ...,TXm} partitions TX into m subsets.
2. whichPart : TX → N+
A companion function to Partm s.t. ∀tx ∈ TXi : whichPartm(tx) = i.
Invariant :
1. Partition Function:
Part is a partition function. ∀m ∈ N+ it must satisfy:
Part(TX ,m) = {TX1 , ...,TXm} such that TX = ⋃mi=1 TXi , ∀i ∈ [m] : TXi ̸= ∅
and ∀i ̸= j : TXi ∩ TXj = ∅.
2. Conflict Preservation / Aggregation:
Part must assign any pair of competing transactions into the same partition.
tx, tx′ ∈ TX are competing transactions ⇒ whichPartm(tx) = whichPartm(tx′).
Definition 3.1 Remote Support:
The remote support of TXi in B(r) is RemoteSuppi(B(r)) ≜ {Supp(TXi) ∩B(r)} \Bri .
3.3.2 Self Containment
Interface Name: Sync
Role: Enables participants to update local states so to reflect global changes.
Key Method:
1. collectSupport : (2TX ,N+)→ 2TX
collectSupporti(B(r)) = collectSupport(B(r), i) return RSri ⊆ {B(r) \Bri }
such that RemoteSuppi(B(r)) ⊆ RSri always holds.
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Invariant : Self Containment must hold throughout the first phase of every round.
Self Containment holds ⇔ ∀i ∈ [m] : Supp(TXi , C(r)) ⊆ Cri .
Theorem 3.1. If a collectSupport function that returns RSri such that ∀i ∈ [m], r ∈ N :
tx ∈ RemoteSuppi(B(r))⇒ tx ∈ RSri is used, then self containment holds throughout the
execution.
Proof. By induction:
Base: C(0) = C0i = ⊥ .
Closure (r > 0): consider progress made by the system:
Cri = Cr−1i ◦Br−1i ◦RSr−1i as determined by Algorithm 2.
C(r) = C(r−1) ◦B(r−1) as defined in 2.9.
Take any x ∈ Supp(TX i, C(r)). Either x ∈ C(r−1) or x ∈ B(r−1).
• If x ∈ C(r−1) then x ∈ Supp(TX i, C(r−1)).
By induction hypothesis, Supp(TX i, C(r−1)) ⊆ Cr−1i and we get x ∈ Cr−1i .
• When x ∈ B(r−1) we have two cases to consider:
– if x ∈ B(r−1) ∩ TX i then x ∈ Br−1i .
– otherwise, x ∈ {B(r−1) \Br−1i } meaning x ∈ RemoteSuppi(B(r−1)) ⊆ RSr−1i
Overall, x ∈ Cr−1i ◦Br−1i ◦RSr−1i = Cri ⇒ Supp(TX i, C(r)) ⊆ Cri
3.3.3 Honest Majority
Interface Name: Membership
Role: Assigns nodes to shards in a tamper-proof manner.
Key Methods:
1. getMembership : ((PK ,SK ), N+, ...)→ (N+, {0, 1}∗)
getMembership((PKu ,SKu), r, . . .)→ ⟨i, σu⟩ where i ∈ [m].
generates σu that uniquely binds PKu with Pi
2. verifyMember : (PK , {0 , 1}∗,N+,N+, ...)→ {True,False}
verifyMember(PKu, σu, i, r)→
True getMembership((PKu ,SKu), r) = ⟨i, σu⟩False otherwise
verifies σu authenticity, for PKu ∈ PKS , i ∈ [m] , r ∈ N+ such that
any σ′u not issued by getMembership returns False with extremely high probability.
Definition 3.2 PK ri − the set of Pi participants at time r:
PK ri = {PKu ∈ PK r | verifyMember(PKu , σu , i, r) = True}
Invariant : Honest majority must hold at all times with extremely high probability.
honest majority holds ⇔ ∀i ∈ [m] : at least hP · |PK ri | of Pi’s participants are honest.
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3.4 Correctness
In this section we prove that any SP created by properly following the algorithms
presented in section 3.2 is indeed correct. Namely, SP satisfies the same safety and
liveness guarantees that an instance of P would have.
SP is assumed to be correctly deployed, with all interface implementations satisfy-
ing the requirements listed in section 3.3. We examine the course of execution in two
parallel P and SP networks that are executing under equal terms. Specifically, both
networks are bootstrapped with the same genesis block, B0, and are running with n
participants, out of which at least h·n are honest. Block-size limitations are disregarded
and comparing SP with an unbounded version of P , we demonstrate equivalent safety
and liveness. Recall that:
• An execution e of P is legal ⇔
every Br outputted by e satisfies Verify(Br, Cr) = True.
• An execution e′ of SP is legal ⇔
every Bri outputted by e′ satisfies Verify(Bri , Cri ) = True.
Lemma 3.4.1 (P ⊆ SP ). For any legal execution e of P that runs with input T ⊆ TX
and outputs B0, B1, B2, ..., there exists an equivalent execution e′ of SP that runs for
the same number of rounds, with the same input T and outputs B(0), B(1), B(2), ... s.t.
∀r ≥ 0 : B(r) = Br.
Proof Sketch. Given e executed by P , we show the existence of a legal execution of SP ,
denoted e′, that always decides B(r) = Br. We inductively construct e′, round by round.
r = 0 : Let’s explicitly demonstrate that Algorithm 1 always returns with B(0) = B0:
This is indeed the case because ∀i ∈ [m] : B0i = B0 ∩ TXi, B(0) =
⋃
i∈[m]
B0i and since
Partm is a partition function B0 =
⋃
i∈[m]
B0 ∩ TXi = ⋃
i∈[m]
B0i = B(0).
r > 0 : Take the inductively constructed e′ that agrees with e up to round r − 1.
Having B(0) = B0, . . . , B(r−1) = Br−1 ⇒ C(r) = Cr we need only to extend e′ by one
additional round where B(r) = Br. P does not allow intra-block transactions, therefore:
Verify(Br, Cr) = True ⇒ ∀X ⊆ Br : Verify(X,Cr) = True
The LHS holds since e is a legal execution. Then the RHS holds too, it holds in
particular for ∀i ∈ [m] : X = Br ∩ TXi. Clearly Br ∩ TXi ⊆ TXi, we have established
that C(r) = Cr and since self containment holds Supp(TXi, Cr) ⊆ Cri . This gives
Verify(Br ∩ TXi, Cri ) = Verify(Br ∩ TXi, Cr) = True, which makes Bri = Br ∩ TXi a
legal Pi output for round r, for every Pi. Overall B(r) =
⋃
i∈[m]
Bri =
⋃
i∈[m]
Br ∩ TXi = Br
makes legal round r output in e′.
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Lemma 3.4.2 (SP ⊆ P ). For any legal execution e′ of SP that runs with input T ⊆ TX
and outputs B(0), B(1), B(2), ... , there exists an equivalent execution e of P that runs
for the same number of rounds, with the same input T and outputs B0, B1, B2, ... s.t.
∀r ≥ 0 : Br = B(r).
Proof. Given e′ executed by SP , we show that an execution of P that always decides
Br = B(r) is legal. If we can find some legal e′ where Verify(B(r), C(r)) = False for
some r, then the inductively constructed e satisfies Verify(Br, Cr) = False, deeming it
illegal. By showing this can never be the case, we prove e is legal and SP is safe.
We have shown in Lemma 3.4.1 that B0 = B(0) and the genesis block is assumed to be
valid. Let us assume, for the sake of contradiction, that an execution e′ of SP in which
there is some round r > 0 where Verify(B(r), C(r)) = False exists. If several such rounds
exist, let r denote the earliest one ⇒ ∀r′ ≤ r − 1 : Verify(B(r′), C(r′)) = True holds.
Therefore, we can inductively construct e, an execution of P that reaches round r with
Cr = B0◦ ...◦Br−1 = B(0)◦ ...◦B(r−1) = C(r) and ∀r′ ≤ r−1 : Verify(Br′ , Cr′) = True.
Claim 3.4.3. ∀i ∈ [m] : Verify(Bri , C(r)) = True
Proof of claim 3.4.3 : Verify(Bri , Cri ) = True must hold, because Bri is the output of an
instance of P running with honest majority under context Cri . Additionally,
self containment holds, ergo Supp(Bri , C(r)) ⊆ Cri ⇒ Verify(Bir, Cri ) =
Verify(Bir, C(r)) = True.
Back to the main proof, by assumption Verify(B(r), C(r)) = False. Therefore, the
distributed block B(r) makes a conflicting set. Let X ⊆ B(r) be a minimal conflicting
set. From Claim 3.4.3 it must be that X contains items from at least two distinct
blocks, Bri , Brj and i ̸= j.
Let us pick txi, txj ∈ X such that txi ∈ Bri , txj ∈ Brj and i ̸= j. Since X is
minimal, txi, txj are competing transactions and must belong to the same partition,
as Part is conflict preserving. However, we specifically selected txi ∈ Bri ⊆ TXi and
txj ∈ Brj ⊆ TXj where i ̸= j ⇒ TXi ∩ TXj = ∅, as Part is a partition function.
This is a contradiction.
Theorem 3.2 (SP = P ).
For any legal execution of P there exists a legal equivalent execution of SP and vice
versa.
Proof. Lemma 3.4.1 above gives P ⊆ SP and Lemma 3.4.2 gives SP ⊆ P .
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Chapter 4
Applying the Framework
In this chapter the framework is put to its first use. We demonstrate the steps required
to properly apply the framework, create a sharded protocol and to assert correctness:
First, an adequate protocol to be sharded is selected. Next, implementations of
all required interfaces are specified and their correctness is proved. Finally, a specific
value for h is set and the values m can take are analyzed. By following these steps, the
sharded protocol is well defined and its correctness is fully asserted.
The selected blockchain protocol for our demonstration is Algorand.
4.1 Related Work - Algorand
4.1.1 Algorand in a Nutshell
Algorand, by Micali et al., [7, 14] is an efficient PoS blockchain protocol with negligible
probability of creating forks. Its efficiency stems mostly from blocks being admitted
to the chain by means of cryptographic sortition, rather than a network-wide race to
find PoW. Adjusted for their stake in the system, users are randomly sampled either
as block proposers or as committee members, once per round. Only a handful of users
may be selected as block proposers. Each selection comes with a priority and the
highest priority proposer is the round leader. The expected committee size is larger
and committee members run a Byzantine Agreement protocol named BA⋆[5] to agree
on the leader’s identity, the proposed block and its admissibility. If any fails, consensus
on the empty block is reached.
Algorand’s cryptographic sortition mechanism is implemented by verifiable random
functions (VRFs)[15]. A selection procedure, executed locally and non-interactively
by the user itself, returns a result res and a proof for that result πru. Selected users
may claim their role as block proposers or committee members by revealing ⟨res, πru⟩
as credentials. Specifically: ⟨res, πru⟩ ← Sortition((PKu ,SKu), seedr , role) requires a
global randomness seed along with the user’s cryptographic keys in order to create πru,
a proof tying a randomly sampled res with PKu, role and round r. The authenticity
of any claimed ⟨res, πru⟩ pair may be verified by VerifySort(PKu , seedr , role, res, πru).
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Note that ⟨res, πru⟩ is publicly verifiable, anyone can execute VerifySort, as it takes
only public parameters. Since Sortition is non-interactive and takes privately kept
data, known only to the user (SKu), selection is discrete. This helps to mitigate
targeted attacks. Algorand’s sortition is considered tamper-proof since a ⟨res, πru⟩ pair
generated in any way other than invoking Sortition((PKu ,SKu), seedr , role) properly,
will not pass VerifySort(PKu , seedr , role, res, πru) with non-negligible probability.
4.1.2 Algorand’s VRF Construction
The following components are assumed to be globally known and publicly available:
• H - a cryptographic hash function that doubles as a random oracle.
• SIG - a unique digital signature scheme.
• seedr - a random seed, available at time r.
Then: πru = SignSKu((seedr , role)) and res = H(πru).
More specifically: a user u, whose PKu ∈ PK r , can generate a unique πru by signing the
string (seedr , role) using SIG. Then, res is created simply by hashing πru. Clearly only u
can generate a valid πru, but anyone can verify πru by calling VerPKu((seedr , role), πru).
Then, res is easily asserted by re-hashing πru.
PKu is selected as a block proposer if res = H(SignSKu(seedr , proposer)) ≤ τproposer
where τproposer is a known threshold. The leader is the user with minimal res value.
Committee members are similarly selected. Since H is a random oracle and seedr is
unpredictable, the output of each H(SignSKu(seedr , role)) is uniformly distributed and
users are randomly sampled.
The initial seed0 is bootstrapped using some distributed random number generation
algorithm. The algorithm is collectively carried by the initial set of users, once genesis
time users register their public keys. Succeeding rounds’ random seeds are efficiently
generated by setting either seedr+1 ← V RFSKu(seedr ◦ r + 1) when PKu is the round
leader and proposed a valid Br or seedr+1 ← H (seedr ◦ r + 1 ) if BA⋆ decided Br = ⊥.
4.1.3 Algorand’s Adversarial Model
Algorand can withstand an adaptive poly-time adversary that controls users holding
up to 1/3 of overall funds in the network. This adversary is seen as a single entity with
perfect coordination and total control over the actions of all malicious participants. It
can initiate an attack and turn an honest participant malicious within a single round
(ttakeover = 1). In order for Algorand to operate properly, at least 2/3 stake in the
system must always be under honest ownership, i.e. hAlgorand = 2/3.
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4.2 Sharding Algorand - Introducing Algoshard
Two sharded variants of Algorand, Algoshard0 and Algoshard1, are introduced in this
chapter. This section provides a high level description and intuition regarding each
protocol. Actual implementations appear in section 4.3, in which both versions of
Algoshard are presented side by side, followed by proofs of their correctness.
We set h = 3/4 in both variants, suited for hAlgorand = 2/3. The same Partition
module is reused by both variants, who split the workload between shards identically.
Each variant has its own Sync and Membership implementations, suited for different
adversarial assumptions, as detailed below.
4.2.1 Algoshard0
Algoshard0 abides Algorand’s strict adversarial model, specifically setting ttakeover = 1.
To withstand such a powerful adversary, one able to corrupt any participants within
a single round, membership leases are ephemeral. Implemented in Eager Membership,
every new round sees a new uniform assignment of all participants into all shards. 1
Assignments are randomly drawn, new assignments are independent of previous ones.
Since Algoshard0 nodes continuously hop from one random shard to another, never
standing still, swift and unpredictable shard transitions must be accommodated. This
is achieved by storing the entire global state locally, as implemented in Eager Sync.
In that sense, Algoshard0 is logically sharded rather than physically sharded. The
block creation process is successfully parallelized, yet the global state remains fully
replicated by all nodes. Overall, Algoshard0 can scale throughput whilst resisting an
extremely able adversary.
4.2.2 Algoshard1
Algoshard1 caters for a more relaxed adversary, with a considerable ttakeover , spanning
an order of one day for example. This setting makes way for longer lasting membership
leases, as attacks take longer to complete. Implemented by Lazy Membership, the pro-
tocol’s execution begins with a uniform assignment of all participants into all shards.
Then, existing assignments gradually shift, as a small set of participants is required to
attain new (uniformly selected) memberships in order to continue participating in the
protocol. Memberships are sticky and cannot be manipulated by an adversary. Upon
joining the system, each participant is assigned a sort of “personalized membership
epoch” timeframe that sprawl specific rounds. Repeated invocations of getMembership
within the same epoch always return the same result. New users must sit out their first
epoch, before being permitted to participate. This helps to mitigate join-leave attacks.
1To be precise, a different certificate could be set for every step in every round of Algorand. This
follows immediately from Algorand’s player replaceability property.
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By definition, members of Pi need nothing more than the (global) support of TXi
in order to execute Pi correctly. Since Lazy Membership puts lengthy memberships in
place, swiftness of transition and thrashing are no longer much of a concern. Thus, local
storage of the entire global state becomes redundant. This is where Lazy Sync comes
into play, as it collects only the missing remote support items of TXi , those needed to
maintain Supp(TXi). Then, local states become proper subsets of the global state, for
any value of m > 1. Moreover, our selection of Part suggests that larger values of m
reduce the relative size of local states, since each shard stores fewer historical records 2.
Moving shards essentially means re-joining the system, a task that may take a few
rounds to complete. Still, this task is infrequent and randomly distributed between the
nodes (epochs are uniformly assigned), therefore should not be obstructing operability.
Overall, Algoshard1 is both physically and logically sharded. The block creation
process is parallelized while also local states are proper subsets of the global state.
Adversarial assumptions are somewhat relaxed in comparison to Algorand, still the
adversary is extremely apt.
The analysis of Algoshard’s Membership implementation, provided in section 4.3.3,
shows that networks with more participants support larger values of m. In densely
populated networks, this implies both increased throughput and reduced local contexts
sizes. Assuming that networks with heavier activity and heftier ledgers also contain
more participants, Algoshard1 truly scales.
4.3 Assembling Algoshard -
Implementation and Correctness
Algoshard0 and Algoshard1 implementations are introduced side by side.
• Partition (section 4.3.1) is shared by both protocols. This section is not divided.
• Eager Sync (in 4.3.2) and Eager Membership (in 4.3.3) implement Algoshard0.
– Both appear on the left side of the relevant section.
• Lazy Sync (in 4.3.2) and Lazy Membership (in 4.3.3) implement Algoshard1.
– Both appear on the right side of the relevant section.
Proof of each interface correctness follows its implementation.
In section 4.3.3 we analyze how to properly select adequate values for m.
Remark. Provided implementations (and proofs) for both Partition and Sync are
generic and may be reused as-is with any suitable protocol. However, Membership’s
implementation is specifically tailored to Algorand, as it piggybacks on the public
randomness Algorand already creates. A generic version for this implementation may be
created too, for example by incorporating a standalone public randomness mechanism.
2Assuming that transactions are uniform between all shards’ clients, each local state is roughly
2/m− 1/m2 the size of the global state.
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4.3.1 Partition
For ease of exposition we transform PKS, the public-key space, into the interval (0, 1].
Algorithm 4: Partition implementation
// ∀i ∈ [m] : define PKS i = ( i− 1
m
,
i
m
]
1 Partm(T ⊆ TX) = Part(T ,m) = {T1 , . . . ,Tm} s.t. Ti = {tx ∈ T | tx.from ∈ PKS i}
2 whichPartm(tx) = ⌈(tx.from) ·m⌉
Intuitively, PKS is lexicographically split into m disjoint intervals of equal sizes,
PKS1 , . . . ,PKSm . Transactions sent from users whose public keys reside in PKS i fall
within TXi and therefore pend Pi’s approval.
Going forward, we refer to users whose public keys falls in PKS i as Pi’s clients.
Proposition 4.3.1. Part is a partition function
Proof. According to definition 2.1, any tx ∈ TX must include exactly one PKfrom ∈ PKS
under tx.from. Take any PKu ∈ PKS , it must fall within the bounds of exactly one
subinterval. This gives TX = ⋃i∈[m]TXi and ∀i ̸= j : TXi ∩ TXj = ∅. Additionally,
∀i ∈ [m] : ∃PKu ∈ PKSi ⇒ ∃tx ∈ TX s.t. tx.from = PKu which means TXi ̸= ∅ and
completes the proof.
Proposition 4.3.2. Part is conflict preserving
Proof. In both the UTXO model and the account balance model, an object is used as
input to a transaction. This object has a single3 owner authorized to sign for it, the
owner of that account or of that UTXO set. All transactions sent by u always fall
within the same TXi partition, where i = ⌈(PKu) ·m⌉. This aggregates all conflicts
that may arise when several transactions clash over the same asset. Formally:
Let X ⊆ TX be some set of transactions such that tx1 , tx2 /∈ X and Verify(X ∪
{tx1}, C) = True, Verify(X ∪ {tx2}, C) = True but Verify(X ∪ {tx1, tx2}, C) = False.
Then, by definition, tx1 , tx2 are competing transactions. Let us prove that Part assigns
both tx1 , tx2 into the same partition, in both schemes we consider possible:
UTXO scheme: Since either one of the pair tx1 , tx2 could be admitted, but not both,
there must be some utx ∈ UTXO that doubles as an input to both transactions.
The owner of utx is the only user authorized to sign and use it, which implies
tx1 .from = tx2 .from = utx.to = PKu . This immediately gives tx1 , tx2 ∈ TX⌈PKu ·m⌉
Balance scheme: Similar analysis leads to concluding that PKu has sufficient funds
for either tx1 or tx2 but (when combined with X) it cannot afford both ⇒
tx1 , tx2 ∈ TX⌈PKu ·m⌉
3Recall, we assume that each transaction has a single sender. We implicitly assume that transactions
from multiple senders / public keys are aggregated into a multisig address (requiring m-of-n signatures).
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4.3.2 Sync
Eager collectSupport reconstructs a global block locally by collecting missing sub-blocks.
Lazy collectSupport collects only transactions sent to Pi’s clients and missing from its
local block. Both Sync implementations are suitable for Partition presented in 4.3.1.
Algorithm 5: Eager collectSupport
Input : B(r) ⊆ TX, i ∈ [m]
Output : {B(r) \Bri } =
{tx ∈ B(r) | tx.from /∈ PKSi}
1 RSri = ∅;
2 foreach tx ∈ B(r) do
3 if tx.from /∈ PKSi then
RSri = RSri ∪ {tx};
4 return RSri ;
Algorithm 6: Lazy collectSupport
Input : B(r) ⊆ TX, i ∈ [m]
Output : {tx ∈ B(r) | tx.from /∈ PKSi ∧
tx.to ∈ PKSi}
1 RSri = ∅;
2 foreach tx ∈ B(r) do
3 if tx.from /∈ PKSi ∧ tx.to ∈ PKSi
then RSri = RSri ∪ {tx};
4 return RSri ;
Algoshard0 uses Eager collectSupport as it enables participants to maintain the full
global state. This makes swift and unpredictable transitions between shards possible.
Proposition 4.3.3. Eager collectSupport guarantees self containment throughout the
entire execution: ∀i ∈ [m], r ∈ N : Supp(TXi, C(r)) ⊆ Cri
Proof. By definition, Eager collectSupport returns RSri = {B(r) \Bri }, for all i ∈ [m].
It follows by induction that Cri = C(r) :
r = 0 : C0i = ⊥ = C(0)
r > 0 : Cri = Cr−1i ◦Br−1i ◦RSr−1i = Cr−1i︸ ︷︷ ︸
C (r−1)
◦Br−1i ◦ {B(r−1) \Br−1i }︸ ︷︷ ︸
B(r−1)
= C(r)
⇒ ∀X ⊆ TX and in particular ∀X ⊆ TXi : Supp(X,C(r)) ⊆ C(r) = Cri .
Algoshard1 uses Lazy collectSupport, a construction that returns a more compact set,
resulting in lighter local states. The following proof establishes that when local contexts
are kept up-to-date by using Lazy collectSupport, self containment is preserved.
Proposition 4.3.4. Lazy collectSupport guarantees that self containment is kept.
It holds that: RemoteSuppi(B(r)) ⊆ {tx ∈ B(r) | tx.from /∈ PKSi ∧ tx.to ∈ PKSi} = RSri .
Proof. We establish Supp(TXi ,C r) ⊆ {tx ∈ TX | tx.from ∈ PKSi ∨ tx.to ∈ PKSi} ∩ C r
first. Then, we show RemoteSuppi(B(r)) ⊆ {tx ∈ B(r) | tx.from /∈ PKSi ∧ tx.to ∈ PKSi}.
Claim 4.3.5. for any X ⊆ TX and any legal Cr :
Supp(X,Cr) ⊆ {tx ∈ Cr | ∃t ∈ X s.t. tx.from = t.from ∨ tx.to = t.from}
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Proof of claim 4.3.5 :
Define Supp′(X) = {tx ∈ TX | ∃t ∈ X s.t. tx.from = t.from ∨ tx.to = t.from}.
It suffices to show that Verify(X,Cr) = Verify(X,Supp′(X) ∩ Cr) always holds.
Let Lu = {tx ∈ TX | tx.from = PKu ∨ tx.to = PKu}. Then, HISTu(C r) ≜ Lu ∩ C r
is the set of all approved transactions sent by or sent to PKu up to time r 4.
Any bookkeeping method used to determine either PKu’s balance or set of UTXO
must return identical results with either Cr or HISTu(Cr) as input. Now, let us
expand Lu’s definition to sets of users by LU ≜
⋃
u∈U
Lu.
For any X ⊆ TX let us define PKX = {PKu ∈ PKS | ∃t ∈ X s.t. t.from = PKu},
the set of users that send payments in X. Then, HISTPKX (Cr) = LPKX ∩Cr is
the complete log of all sent and received transactions by members of PKX since
genesis. This log suffices to deduce the complete set of their up-to-date resources,
as appearing in Cr. Therefore X, as well as any other set of transactions sent
from PKX ’s members, satisfies Verify(X,Cr) = Verify(X,HISTPKX (Cr)). Note
that HISTPKX (C r) = Supp′(X) ∩ Cr.
Overall, Verify(X,Cr) = Verify(X,Supp′(X) ∩ Cr) holds.
Corollary 4.1. Supp(TXi, Cr) ⊆ {tx ∈ TX | tx.from ∈ PKS i ∨ tx.to ∈ PKS i} ∩ Cr.
It is a direct result of claim 4.3.5, simply by plugging in X = TXi.
Let us define: LSupp(TXi) = {tx ∈ TX | tx.from ∈ PKSi}
RSupp(TXi) = {tx ∈ TX | tx.from /∈ PKSi ∧ tx.to ∈ PKSi}
LSupp(TXi) ∩ RSupp(TXi) = ∅ and
LSupp(TXi) ∪ RSupp(TXi) = {tx ∈ TX | tx.from ∈ PKS i ∨ tx.to ∈ PKS i} = Supp′(TXi)
both hold. Observe that B(r) ∩ LSupp(TXi) = Bri , by 4.3.1. Corollary 4.1 gives:
Supp′(TXi) ∩B(r) ⊆ {tx ∈ B(r) | tx.from ∈ PKS i ∨ tx.to ∈ PKS i}.
These give way to RemoteSuppi(B(r)) = Supp(TXi)∩{B(r)\Bri } ⊆ RSupp(TXi) ∩ B(r) =
{tx ∈ B(r) | tx.from /∈ PKS i ∧ tx.to ∈ PKS i} which completes the main proof.
4Generally speaking, this makes the set of all resources attained and released by PKu up to time r.
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4.3.3 Membership
A key part of Algoshard’s construction, as well as the reason for surveying Algorand’s
VRFs in-depth earlier, is implementing Membership by a VRF construction very similar
to Algorand’s sortition procedure.
The general idea behind Algoshard’s Membership is the following:
A global random seed, common to all participants and all shards, is maintained through-
out the execution. Users locally generate their own shard assignments and membership
certificates. Users propagate their certificates, for others to verify, whenever necessary.
A certificate σu is created by computing σu = SignSKu(seed). Then, a uniform shard is
selected by using σu as an input to .H, thereby binding u with Pi where i = ⌈.H(σu)·m⌉.
Assuming that seed is indeed random, SIG is a unique signature scheme and .H is a
cryptographic hash function implies that .H(σu) yields a uniformly drawn (binary)
value between 0 and 1. This, in turn, implies that i ∈ [m] is indeed randomly drawn.
Any user-claimed assignment is easily verifiable, simply by executing VerPKu(seed, σu)
and recalculating ⌈.H(σu) ·m⌉.
The binding between participants and assigned shards is time-restricted, thereby
averting targeted attacks on specific shard(s). Restriction details are variant dependant:
In EagerMembership, used by Algoshard0, certificates are valid for a single round. 5
LazyMembership, used by Algoshard1, begins by bootstrapping a uniform assignment
of all initial participants into all shards. It then proceeds by slowly shuffling current
assignments. A global parameter 1 ≤ tlease ≤ ttakeover is set by the deployer. Upon
joining the network, PKu is publicly and randomly assigned a slot tshuffleu ∈ [0, tlease−1].
Every tlease rounds, starting from tshuffleu , its previous certificate expires and PKu must
acquire a new membership lease in order to continue participating in the protocol. New
participants must wait tlease rounds before their tshuffleu slot is set and their first shard
assignment is known and comes into effect. This resolves join-leave attacks.
Throughout Algoshard’s execution, participants essentially invoke one VRF in order
to select which second VRF they should call. ⟨iu, σu⟩ ← getMembership((PKu ,SKu), r)
followed by Algorand’s ⟨res, πru⟩ ← Sortition((PKu ,SKu), seedriu , role) are both needed.
That is because Pi’s members simply discard u’s actions, even those sent with ⟨res, πru⟩
that allows u to act as block proposer or verifier, unless σu that permits u to participate
in Pi is also provided.
5EagerMembership is actually a special, simpler, case of LazyMembership where tlease = 1.
EagerMembership’s algorithms are explicitly included, as it might be easier to follow this much simpler
variant before proceeding to the general version.
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Bootstrapping Membership
Algorithm 7: EagerMembership init
Input : m ∈ N+,PK0 ⊆ PKS
Output : participants bookkeeping
1 seed0 = AlgorandInitRandomness(PK0 );
2 foreach i ∈ [m] do
// init Pi's public randomness
3 seed1i ← H (seed0 + i)
4 end
5 seed1 = H (seed11 ◦ . . . ◦ seed1m);
6 foreach PKu ∈ PK0 do
// publicly logged by all nodes
7 tjoinPKu = 0;
// privately invoked by each
participant
8 ⟨i1u, σ1u⟩ = getMembership((PKu,SKu), 1 );
9 join Pi1u ;
10 end
11 return {(PKu, tjoinPKu ) |PKu ∈ PK0};
Algorithm 8: LazyMembership init
Input : m ∈ N+,PK0 ⊆ PKS , tlease ∈ N+
Output : participants bookkeeping
1 seed0 = AlgorandInitRandomness(PK0 );
2 foreach i ∈ [m] do
// init Pi's public randomness
3 seed1i ← H (seed0 + i)
4 end
5 seed1 = H (seed11 ◦ . . . ◦ seed1m);
6 foreach PKu ∈ PK0 do
// publicly logged by all nodes
7 tjoinPKu = 0;
8 tshufflePKu = H (PKu ◦ seed1 ) (mod tlease);
// privately invoked by each participant
9 ⟨i1u, σ1u⟩ = getMembership((PKu,SKu), 1 );
10 join Pi1u ;
11 end
12 return {(PKu, tjoinPKu , t
shuffle
PKu ) |PKu ∈ PK0};
Once genesis time participants register their public keys, one initial random seed is selected. This seed0
is generated by genesis time users calling the same distributed random numbers generation algorithm
Algorand employs. seed0 is then used to kick-start m independent instances of Algorand, rather than
only one. This is efficiently done by setting Pi’s initial public randomness to be seed1i = H (seed0 + i),
which is indeed random since seed0 is randomly selected and H is a random oracle.
Both Membership variants begin with a uniform assignment of all participants into all shards.
The initial assignment depends on seed1 , whose value is unknown at the time participants register
their public keys. In LazyMembership, each PKu is publicly and randomly assigned a permanent
tshuffleu ∈ [0, tlease − 1] slot. Note that tshuffleu is publicly verifiable and it is always determined by a
random seed that is still unknown when u registers PKu .
The following m+ 1 public randomness seeds are maintained throughout the execution:
• seedr1, . . . , seedrm - local public randomness seeds.
seedri is the public randomness used by Pi. Its progression follows Algorand’s standard definition:
seedr+1i is either V RFSKu(seedri ◦ r + 1) or H(seedri ◦ r + 1), depending on Bri .
• seedr - a global public randomness seed, serves as input to Membership.
seedr ≜ H (seedr1 ◦ . . . ◦ seedrm) is created by bundling all m local public seeds.
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VRF construction
Algorithm 9: Eager getMembership
Input : (PKu, SKu), r
Output : ⟨iru, σru⟩
1 σru = Sign(SKu, seedr);
2 hru = .H(σru);
3 iru = ⌈hru ·m⌉;
4 return ⟨iru, σru⟩;
Algorithm 10: Lazy getMembership
Input : (PKu, SKu), r
Output : ⟨iru, σru⟩
1 slot = r % tlease;
2 diff = slot− tshuffleu (mod tlease);
3 r′ = r − diff ;
4 σru = Sign(SKu, seedr
′);
5 hru = .H(σru);
6 iru = ⌈hru ·m⌉;
7 return ⟨iru, σru⟩;
To participate in Algoshard, u must acquire membership in some Pi and a proof thereof. This is
done by executing getMembership((PKu ,SKu), r)→ ⟨iru, σru⟩ locally and non-interactively. Since seedr
is unpredictable and H is a random oracle, hru = .H(σru) is uniform between 0 and 1 which makes
iru ∈ [m] a uniformly selected shard index.
Algorithm 11: Eager verifyMember
Input : PKu, σru, i, r
Output : True σru proves PKu ’s Pi
membership in round r
False otherwise
1 if ⌈.H(σru) ·m⌉ ̸= i then return False;
2 if PKu /∈ PKr−1 then return False;
3 return Ver(PKu, seedr, σru);
Algorithm 12: Lazy verifyMember
Input : PKu, σru, i, r
Output : True σru proves PKu ’s Pi
membership in round r
False otherwise
1 if ⌈.H(σu) ·m⌉ ̸= i then return False;
2 if PKu /∈ PKmax{0,r−tlease} then return False;
3 attain tshufflePKu ;
4 slot = r % tlease;
5 diff = slot− tshufflePKu (mod tlease);
6 r′ = r − diff ;
7 return Ver(PKu, seedr
′
, σu);
By adopting Algorand’s cryptographic assumptions regarding SIG and H, it follows that ⟨iru, σru⟩
is unforgeable by a poly-time adversary.
It remains to prove the resulting assignments are indeed safe, even when facing an adaptive adversary.
This is done in proposition 4.3.6.
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Additional functionalities
Algorithm 13: Eager newNodesArrival
Input : r ∈ N+, PKrnew ⊆ PKS
Output : new participants bookkeeping
// publicly logged by all nodes
1 foreach PKu ∈ PK rnew do
2 tjoinPKu = r ;
3 end
4 return {(PKu, tjoinPKu ) |PKu ∈ PK rnew};
Algorithm 14: Lazy newNodesArrival
Input : r ∈ N+,PK rnew ⊆ PKS , tlease ∈ N+
Output : new participants bookkeeping
// publicly logged by all nodes
1 foreach PKu ∈ PK rnew do
// recorded at time r
2 tjoinPKu = r ;
// set after benching PKu tlease rounds
3 tshufflePKu = H (PKu ◦ seed
tjoinPKu+tlease) (mod tlease);
4 end
5 return {(PKu, tjoinPKu , t
shuffle
PKu ) |PKu ∈ PK rnew};
Algorithm 15: Eager endOfRound
Input : r , seedr+11 , . . . , seedr+1m
Output : seedr+1 , updated membership
// locally executed by each node
1 seedr+1 = H (seedr+11 ◦ . . . ◦ seedr+1m );
2 ⟨ir+1u , σr+1u ⟩ =
getMembership((PKu,SKu), r + 1 );
3 leave Piru and join Pir+1u ;
4 return seedr+1 ;
Algorithm 16: Lazy endOfRound
Input : r , seedr+11 , . . . , seedr+1m
Output : seedr+1 , updated membership
// locally executed by each node
1 seedr+1 = H (seedr+11 ◦ . . . ◦ seedr+1m );
2 if tshufflePKu ≡ r + 1 (mod tlease) then
3 ⟨ir+1u , σr+1u ⟩ =
getMembership((PKu,SKu), r + 1 );
4 leave current Pi and join Pir+1u ;
5 end
6 return seedr+1 ;
Proposition 4.3.6. Given n participants, of which at least 3n4 are honest, an appropriately set
parameter m and faced with an adaptive adversary that is able to corrupt participants in ttakeover
rounds: both EagerMembership and LazyMembership guarantee an honest majority of hAlgorand = 2/3
in all shards with extremely high probability.
35
Membership Correctness
Transitioning into balls and bins Consider representing an honest participant by
a blue ball, a Byzantine participant by a red ball and each Pi by a bin. Then the anal-
ysis of failure could be seen as a model with 3n4 blue balls and n4 red balls placed into m
bins, according to Membership’s logic. If a state in which the number of blue balls in
some bin is less than twice the number of red balls in that bin is reached, we lose, hon-
est majority breaks. We bound this probability throughout the execution. Let us begin:
The initial uniform assignment of both Membership variants goes as follows:
All n balls, regardless of color, are independently and uniformly tossed into all m bins.
Lemma 4.3.7. Let us define failure as any of the bins having a red to overall balls
ratio greater than or equal to 1/3. In a setting with 3n4 blue balls and n4 red balls, all
uniformly assigned into m bins, it holds that Pr(failure) < 2me− n144m .
Proof. Let us examine the situation in the ith bin (analysis is symmetric for all bins
and we union bound it later). From the bin’s perspective, any tossed ball is a Bernoulli
trial with success probability p = Pr(X = 1) = 1m and all tosses are independent. We
denote Y as the number of blue balls assigned to our bin and Z as the number of red
balls assigned to our bin. We get that Y = Y1 + Y2 + ... + Y 3n
4
where Yj represents
the jth blue Bernoulli experiment and Z = Z1 + Z2 + ...+ Zn4 where Zj represents the
jth red Bernoulli experiment, alternatively Y ∼ Bin(3n4 , 1m), Z ∼ Bin(n4 , 1m). In both
cases we have that E[Y ] = 3n4m and E[Z] = n4m . We define X = Y + Z as the total
number of balls in the bin. Clearly Y, Z are independent (as all tosses are i.i.d.) and
then X ∼ Bin(n, 1m) with E[X] = nm . Complying with the law of large numbers, as
n→∞ and while keeping m constant or sufficiently small, Y → 3n4m and Z → n4m . The
expected ratio of red to overall balls in the bin is E[ ZY+Z ] =
E[Z]
E[Y ]+E[Z] =
1
4 . We may
deviate somewhat from the mean and still reach an acceptable (non-failed) state. In
order to estimate how likely it is to deviate too far, we now bound the tail probability
Pr( ZY+Z ≥ 13) of states in which the system breaks, as we cannot safely run Pi with
too many Byzantine players.
1. Pr(Y ≤ 2.5n4m ) ≤ e
− n96m
– The Chernoff bound Pr(X ≤ (1− δ)µ) ≤ e− δ
2µ
2 applied on Y with δ = 16 and
µ = E[Y ] = 3n4m gives
Pr(Y ≤ 2.5n4m ) = Pr(Y ≤ (1− 16) 3n4m) ≤ e−
( 16 )
2· 3n4m
2 = e− n96m .
2. Pr(Z ≥ 1.25n4m ) ≤ e
− n144m
– Similarly, using the bound Pr(X ≥ (1 + δ)µ) ≤ e− δ
2µ
2+δ on Z with δ = 14 and
µ = E[Z] = n4m gives Pr(Z ≥ 1.254m ) ≤ e
− (
1
4 )
2· n4m
2+14 = e− n144m .
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3. Pr( Z
Y + Z ≥
1
3) < 2e
− n144m .
– Following (1) and (2), the probability of failure from the ith bin perspective satisfies:
Pr( ZY+Z ≥ 13)
(∗)︷︸︸︷
≤ 1− (1− e− n96m )(1− e− n144m ) = e− n96m + e− n144m − e− n96m · e− n144m ≤
e−
n
96m + e− n144m < 2e− n144m .
(*) Let us define A = {all assignments where Y ≤ 2.5n4m } and B = {all assignments
where Z ≥ 1.25n4m }. Then, A = {all assignments with Y > 2.5n4m } is a set of states
where there aren’t too few blue balls and B = {all assignments with Z < 1.25n4m }
is a set of states where there aren’t too many red balls. It follows that all
assignments in C ≜ A ∩ B satisfy ZY <
1.25n
4m
2.5n
4m
= 12 ⇒ ZY+Z < 13 are non-failed
states where the ratio between red and blue balls is acceptable. Since A,B are
independent and must both occur in order to land C, we encounter C with
probability (1−Pr(A)) · (1−Pr(B)) which is at least (1− e− n96m )(1− e− n144m )
according to the bounds in (1) and (2). We’ve shown that all the states in C
are acceptable, implying that all unacceptable (failed) states necessarily reside
within its complement, C which is bounded by 1−
C︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− e− n96m )︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
· (1− e− n144m )︸ ︷︷ ︸
B︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
4. All bins follow the same distribution, allowing us to union bound (3) over all m bins.
We conclude that Pr(failure) < m · (2e− n144m ) = 2me− n144m .
Corollary 4.2. With m set appropriately, EagerMembership fails only with negligible
probability, even when continuously running for over a million years (∗).
(∗) for any values of m ≤ 10000 ∧ n ≥ 15000m we get astronomically small bounds.
That is, we can safely support up to 10,000 shards when expecting at least 15,000 par-
ticipants per shard on average. Similarly, any m ≤ 700 and n/m ≥ 10000 adequately
bounds smaller networks.
Proof. Running with EagerMembership, every new round begins with a new uniform
assignment adhering to the analyzed distribution. Plugging in the above numbers
gives Pr(failed round | m ≤ 10000 ∧ n ≥ 15000m) < 10−40. We can also attain
Pr(failed round | n ≥ 10000m) < 2me 6259 < 10−29 ·m, which bounds the second case
with Pr(failed round | m ≤ 700 ∧ n ≥ 10000m) < 10−27.
Following Algorand’s one round per minute rate gives a total of 5.26 · 1011 rounds
when running for one million years. By union bounding any of the above bounds over
the course of 5.26 · 1011 rounds, we are still at most 10−15 likely to fail.
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Iterated balls into bins LazyMembership can be viewed as an iterated balls into
bins process. When a ball joins this process, it is imprinted with a uniformly drawn
number between 0 and tlease − 1. During the first iteration, where r = 1, all balls are
uniformly thrown into m bins. Then, for any iteration r > 1, we take all balls whose
imprinted numbers equal r modulo tlease out of their bins and re-throw them at random.
Lemma 4.3.8. When dealing with a static adversary (ttakeover = ∞, balls cannot
change color), the balls-into-bins distributing for any round r > 1 equals the initial
uniform assignment distribution that occurs for r = 1.
Proof. The initial distribution encountered at r = 1 consists of uniformly assigning balls
into bins, in any order. The actual order in which balls are placed in their assigned
bins makes no difference. Then, two equivalent ways to reach the state at r = 2 are:
1. Uniformly assign all balls into bins, in any order. Remove all of the balls whose
imprinted numbers equals 2 from their bins. Reassign removed balls uniformly.
2. Uniformly assign all balls whose imprinted numbers do not equal 2 into bins.
Wait. Uniformly assign all remaining balls.
Clearly, option 2 is a uniform assignment of all balls into all bins. Then, the first two
iterations are identically distributed, as succeeding iterations are, by induction.
Corollary 4.3. Faced with a static adversary that can introduce malicious users into the
system but cannot attack honest users, LazyMembership is as safe as EagerMembership.
Lemma 4.3.9. For any selection of tlease where 1 ≤ tlease ≤ ttakeover , an adaptive
adversary (with a finite ttakeover) cannot do any better than a static adversary.
Proof. By contradiction. Let us assume, for the sake of contradiction, that some adap-
tive adversary can plan an attack on a target set B = {b1, ..., bk} of k blue balls and
do better than simply sticking with the same set of red balls it already owns.
We assume that the adversary is at capacity and owns n/4 red balls (if this isn’t
the case, we paint red some randomly selected blue balls and hand those over). Let
R = {r1, ..., rk} be the subset of red balls that must released in order to attack B, as
selected by the adversary’s strategy. When the attack completes, ttakeover rounds after
it was set in motion, all balls in B are painted red and all balls in R are painted blue. In
the meantime, since tlease ≤ ttakeover all balls in the system, and in particular those in
B and R, are uniformly reassigned. Recall that once an attack has been set in motion
it cannot be aborted and must carry on until completion.
Take any set B the adversary may possibly choose to target given any (poly-time)
algorithm. By the time the attack completes, any bi ∈ B the adversary gained control
over (painted red) is exactly 1/m likely to be in any specific bin. At the same time,
any ri ∈ R the adversary released (painted blue) is also 1/m likely to be in that same
bin, as all assignments are unpredictable. Contradiction to the assumption that any
such dynamic strategy beats a static strategy.
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Corollary 4.4. Faced with either a static or an adaptive adversary, LazyMembership
is as safe as EagerMembership. Its failure rate adheres the same upper bounds.
Conclusion: This completes the proof of proposition 4.3.6. Correctness of both
Membership implementations has been asserted, when setting m ≤ n10000 .
Take note that the bounds we used in lemma 4.3.7 are rather loose.
In practice, simulations with n/m ≈ 1500 passed hundreds of millions of rounds without
failing once.
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Chapter 5
Additional Related Work
Several recent efforts focus on sharding permissionless blockchain protocols. Common,
rather intuitive, guiding lines seem to unify all of these efforts (this thesis included):
nodes are scattered between distinct groups, members of each group run some internal
protocol among themselves and different groups can communicate with each other.
Nevertheless, it appears that all existing work has taken an ad-hoc approach, by
introducing specific sharded protocols, rather than providing a generalized methodology
for sharding. When introducing concrete protocols with no previous groundwork, each
protocol’s correctness must be fully asserted from scratch, a tedious and error-prone
task. A modular framework design, like the one introduced in this thesis, seems like an
overall preferable approach. It provides additional advantages such as applicability to
already-existing protocols, reusable modules that could shard several different protocols
without work duplication etc.
5.1 Recent Sharded Protocols
5.1.1 OmniLedger
OmniLedger [10] is a sharded variant of ByzCoin [9] that follows the aforementioned
guidelines. OmniLedger is a UTXO based blockchain protocol. It uses an Algorand-like
VRF to elect each epoch’s leader, who in turn leads an execution of RandHound [18].
RandHound’s output is used to determine a global nodes-into-shards assignment per-
mutation. Transitioning between epochs, swap-out policies are locally set by each shard.
OmniLedger introduces a several-rounds-long cross shard transaction approval process.
This process is driven by the client. After initializing a cross shard transaction, the user
has to gather proofs-of-acceptance for all UTXO inputs, from their respective shards,
in order to admit the cross shard transaction. Aborting a cross shard transaction can
be done by collecting a proof-of-rejection for one of the UTXO inputs. Presenting a
proof-of-rejection for any such input enables to reclaim the funds from another already
accepted input. In cases where some input is neither accepted nor rejected, the user
must wait. An already-admitted input is marked as spent, it cannot be reclaimed
41
or reused until some proof-of-rejection is provided. Such lock-unlock mechanism is,
in essence, very similar to using a multisig address as a payer, after gathering desired
funds into that account. In fact, several constructions presented in Algoshard are rather
similar to those appearing in OmniLedger. Still, it should be noted that OmniLedger
is far less formal and proofs for many of their claims are lacking or missing.
5.1.2 RapidChain
RapidChain [19] is a new blockchain protocol that comes sharded by design, rather
than an adaptation of some pre-existing protocol. It executes in epochs, within a
strongly synchronous environment and assumes a limited slowly adaptive adversary.
RapidChain’s adversary is rather weak, it can commit only a small constant number of
join-leave attacks per epoch. Equivalently, the adversary can attack a constant number
of nodes and only during the epoch’s end.
RapidChain maintains k + 1 committees. The first committee is called a reference
committee. The reference committee is in charge of establishing participants identity,
generating random strings and setting shard assignments. The other k committees
are simply known as shards. They run synchronous consensus protocols among shard
members to approve pending transactions. Transaction approval as well the task of
storing the entire UTXO set are partitioned between the different shards, according to
transactions’ ids. RapidChain’s approach to cross shard transactions, in which some
inputs reside within different partitions, is the following: Once a cross shard tx is
submitted, the committee in charge of approving tx creates a new transaction for any
UTXO input that resides within another shard. These intermediate transactions are
meant for transferring funds from their current shard into the same shard as tx. Once
all intermediate transactions have been approved, funds are locally available and tx
too should be approved. RapidChain’s committee-to-committee routing mechanism is
patterned after distributed hash table (DHT) design, as in Kademlia [13]. In order to
participate in the protocol, participants need to solve PoW puzzles, to “activate” their
public keys, this is done once per epoch. It is assumed that computing power held by
all participants in the system is equal.
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5.2 A Few Notes Regarding Cross Shard Transactions
Compared with the approach presented in this thesis, it seems as if both OmniLedger
and RapidChain overcomplicate the treatment of cross shard transactions. We manage
to avoid the issue altogether, while also allowing all participants to send and receive
money from each other. This was accomplished by providing general definitions, fine-
tuning the partitions and ultimately maintaining a double-entry ledger. Double-entry
bookkeeping [3, 4] is a well known bookkeeping system in which every transaction is
recorded (at least) twice, once as credit and once as debit 1. Then, our two-phased
round structure boils down to updating the debit column followed by updating the
credit column. Since our double-entry ledger is always kept up-to-date and partitioned
appropriately, we never partially commit transactions that might need to be aborted, as
in OmniLedger 2. Nor do we need to explicitly initiate complex multi-step transactions
with intermediate transfers that must first be completed to determine whether the
enclosing transaction should be approved or denied, as in RapidChain. Note that
the design presented in RapidChain does not reduce the storage overhead compared
with our solution. That is because duplicate transfer transactions are created and
locally stored by the receiving shard. Moreover, since the enclosing transaction could
fail after some intermediate transfers were completed, new transactions that use these
already transferred funds may originate from different shards. In this case, additional
intermediate transactions must be created, which means that the storage overhead is
actually worse.
1Equivalently, once as an incoming transaction and once as an outgoing transaction
2Transferring money to a multisig address is external to this issue. However, this scenario is fairly
easily solvable, for example by using a script requiring 1-of-n signature to send funds back if a multisig
transaction was not admitted within a certain timeframe.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis introduced a general methodology for sharding blockchain protocols.
In chapter 2, a formal model expressing the behavior of blockchain protocols was laid
out. In chapter 3, building on top of these definitions, a rigorous sharding scheme
was introduced. The scheme is specified while black-boxing some core functionality,
making it modular and generic. A proof binding the definitions described in chapter 2
and requirements detailed in chapter 3 asserts the framework’s overall correctness.
Chapter 4 demonstrates that the requirements details in chapter 3 are indeed feasible,
by introducing concrete implementations and creating a sharded variant of Algorand.
6.1 Discussion
6.1.1 Relaxing Some Assumptions
In chapters 2 and 3 we made a few assumptions regarding an arbitrary blockchain
protocol, denoted P . These assumptions were made in order to attain stronger results
and simplify the algorithms. Let us examine the consequences of removing them:
• Intra-Block Transactions: It must be assumed that P does not permit intra-
block transactions to obtain P = SP .
Removing this assumption, the SP ⊆ P direction of the proof in section 3.4 still
holds, for protocols that do allow intra-block transactions too. This makes such
protocols’ sharded counterparts safe (albeit possibly slower than the original).
• Forks: We assume that P does not fork in order to simplify the algorithms.
If P may fork with non-negligible probability, each sync phase could simply lag
k rounds behind the corresponding protocol phase. Adjusting k such that the
probability of overturning blocks after k rounds is negligible.
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6.1.2 Applicability to Existing Networks
To transform an active, non-sharded network into a sharded one, these steps could be
followed:
1. Create a snapshot of the current state of the ledger (preferably as an account-
balance list), formatted as a genesis block B0snapshot .
2. Use B0snapshot to bootstrap a sharded variant of the protocol.
6.2 Future Work
Our current model assumes that while nodes may join or leave arbitrarily, their order
of magnitude remains constant throughout the entire execution. Supporting further
dynamicity requires restructuring partitions. This might be required in case of massive
departures, in order to ensure that honest majority is maintained. Also, in case of
massive arrivals, when shards overcrowd it might be wise to adjust their number. The
technical details of such scheme are left for future work.
Another possible extension is forming a “snitching” committee that collects proofs of
Byzantine behavior in a specific shard and propagates them to participants outside that
shard. Alternatively, per-shard validity proofs could be integrated into the protocol.
These extensions can reduce the gap in tolerance to Byzantine nodes between 1/3 that
is required by Algorand and 1/4 that we currently require, it may also enable dealing
with a stronger adversary.
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